Home automation platforms provide a new level of convenience by enabling consumers to automate various aspects of physical objects in their homes. While the convenience is benecial, security aws in the platforms or integrated third-party products can have serious consequences for the integrity of a user's physical environment. In this paper we perform a systematic security evaluation of two popular smart home platforms, Google's Nest platform and Philips Hue, that implement home automation "routines" (i.e., trigger-action programs involving apps and devices) via manipulation of state variables in a centralized data store. Our semi-automated analysis examines, among other things, platform access control enforcement, the rigor of non-system enforcement procedures, and the potential for misuse of routines. This analysis results in ten key ndings with serious security implications. For instance, we demonstrate the potential for the misuse of smart home routines in the Nest platform to perform a lateral privilege escalation, illustrate how Nest's product review system is ineective at preventing multiple stages of this attack that it examines, and demonstrate how emerging platforms may fail to provide even bare-minimum security by allowing apps to arbitrarily add/remove other apps from the user's smart home. Our ndings draw attention to the unique security challenges of platforms that execute routines via centralized data stores, and highlight the importance of enforcing security by design in emerging home automation platforms.
INTRODUCTION
Internet-connected, embedded computing objects known as smart home products have become extremely popular with consumers. The utility and practicality aorded by these devices has spurred tremendous market interest, with over 20 billion smart home products projected to be in use by 2020 [13] . The diversity of these Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for prot or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specic permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CODASPY '19, March 25-27, 2019 , Richardson, TX, USA © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6099-9/19/03. . . $15.00 https://doi.org /10.1145/3292006.3300031 products is staggering, ranging from small physical devices with embedded computers such as smart locks and light bulbs, to full edged appliances such as refrigerators and HVAC systems. In the modern computing landscape, smart home devices are unique as they provide an often imperceptible bridge between the digital and physical worlds by connecting physical objects to digital services via the Internet, allowing the user to conveniently automate their home. However, because many of these products are tied to the user's security or privacy (e.g., door locks, cameras), it is important to understand the attack surface of such devices and platforms, in order to build practical defenses without sacricing utility.
As the market for smart home devices has continued to mature, a new software paradigm has emerged to facilitate smart home automation via the interactions between smart home devices and the apps that control them. These interactions may be expressed as routines, which are sequences of app and device actions that are executed upon one or more triggers, i.e., an instance of the trigger-action paradigm in the smart home. Routines are becoming the foundational unit of home automation [8, 40, 48, 49] , and as a result, it is natural to characterize existing platforms based on how routines are implemented.
If we categorize available platforms based on how routines are facilitated, we observe two broad categories: (1) API-based Smart Home Managers such as Yeti [53] , Yonomi [54] , IFTTT [18] , and Stringify [46] that allow users to chain together a diverse set of devices using third-party APIs exposed by device vendors, and (2) smart home platforms such as Google's Works with Nest [32], Samsung SmartThings [43] , and Philips Hue [38] that leverage centralized data stores to monitor and maintain the states of IoT devices. We term these platforms as Data Store-Based (DSB) Smart Home Platforms. In DSB platforms, complex routines are executed via reads/writes to state variables in a central data store. This paper is motivated by a key observation that while routines are supported via centralized data stores in all DSB platforms, there are dierences in the manner in which routines are created, observed, and managed by the user. That is, SmartThings encourages users to take full control of creating and managing routines involving third-party apps and devices via the SmartThings app. On the contrary, in Nest, users do not have a centralized perspective of routines at all, and instead, manage routines using third-party apps/devices. This key dierence may imply unique security challenges for Nest. Similarly, being a much simpler platform within this category of DSB platforms, Hue represents another unique and interesting instance of the DSB platform paradigm. While prior work has explored the security of routines enabled by a smart home manager (i.e., specically, IFTTT recipes [47] ), the permission enforcement and application security in the SmartThings platform [12] , and the side-eects of SmartThings SmartApps [4] , there is a notable gap in current research. Namely, prior studies do not evaluate the potential for adversarial misuse of routines, which are the essence of DSB platforms, and by extension, home automation. Contributions: This paper performs a systematic security analysis of some of the less studied, but widely popular, data store-based smart home platforms, i.e., Nest and Hue, helping to close the existing gap in prior research. In particular, we evaluate (1) the access control enforcement in the platforms themselves, (2) the robustness of other non-system enforcement (e.g., product reviews in Nest), (3) the use and more importantly the misuse of routines via manipulation of the data store by low-integrity devices, 1 and nally, (4) the security of applications that integrate into these platforms. To our knowledge, this paper is the rst to analyze this relatively new class of smart home platforms, in particular the Nest and Hue platforms, and to provide a holistic analysis of routines, their use, and potential for their misuse in DSB platforms. Moreover, this paper is the rst to analyze the accuracy of app-dened permission prompts, which form one of the few sources of access control information for the user. Our novel ndings (F 1 !F 10 ), summarized as follows, demonstrate the unique security challenges faced by DSB platforms at the cost of seamless automation:
• Misuse of routines -The permission model in Nest is negrained and enforced according to specications (F 1 ), giving low-integrity third-party apps/devices (e.g., a switch) little room for directly modifying the data store variables of high-integrity devices (e.g., security cameras). However, the routines supported by Nest allow low-integrity devices/apps to indirectly modify the state of high-integrity devices, by modifying the shared variables that both high/low integrity devices rely on (F 4 ). • Lack of systematic defenses -Nest does not employ transitive access control enforcement to prevent indirect modication of security-sensitive data store variables; instead, it relies on a product review of application artifacts before allowing API access. We discover that the product review process is insucient and may not prevent malicious exploitation of routines; i.e., the review mandates that apps prompt the user before modifying certain variables, but does not validate what the prompt contain, allowing apps to deceive users into providing consent (F 5 ). Moreover, permission descriptions provided by apps during authorization are also often incorrect or misleading (F 6 , F 9 ), which demonstrates that malicious apps may easily nd ways to gain more privilege than necessary (F 7 ), circumventing both users and the Nest product review (F 8 ). • Lateral privilege escalation -We nd that smart home apps, particularly those that connect to Nest and have permissions to access security-sensitive data store variables, have a signicantly high rate of SSL vulnerabilities (F 10 ). We combine these SSL aws with the ndings discussed previously (specically F 4 !F 9 ) and demonstrate a novel form of a lateral privilege escalation attack. That is, we compromise a low-integrity app that has access to the user's Nest smart home (e.g., a TP Link Kasa switch), use the compromised app to change the state of the data store to trigger a security-sensitive routine, and indirectly change the state of a high-integrity Nest device (e.g., the Nest security camera). This 1 In the context of our study, we dene a device as high-integrity if it is advertised as security-critical by the device vendor (e.g., Nest Cam) while those that are not security-critical are referred to as low-integrity (e.g., Philips Hue lamp). that leverage centralized data stores. Note that H is the universe of all home state variables, and V de ice i is the universe of all state variables specic to device i attack can be used to deceive the Nest Cam into determining that the user is home when they are actually away, and prevent it from monitoring the home in the user's absence. • Lack of bare minimum protections -Unlike Nest, the access control enforcement of Hue is woefully inadequate. Third-party apps that have been added to a user's Hue platform may arbitrarily add other third-party apps without user consent, despite an existing policy that the user must consent by physically pressing a button (F 2 ). Making matters worse, an app may remove other apps integrated with the platform by exploiting unprotected data store variables in Hue (F 3 ). These vulnerabilities may allow an app with seemingly useful functionality (i.e., a Trojan [20] ) to install malicious add-ons in a manner invisible to the user, and replace the user's integrated apps with its malicious substitutes. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the key attributes of DSB platforms, and provides background. Section 3 provides an overview of our analysis, and Sections 4, 5 and 6 describe our analysis of permission enforcement in Nest and Hue, security ramications of routines, and security of smart home apps, respectively. Section 7 provides an end-to-end attack, and Section 8 describes the lessons learned. Section 9 describes the vendors' response to our ndings. Section 10 describes the threats to validity. Section 11 describes the related work, and Section 12 concludes.
Central Data

HOME AUTOMATION VIA CENTRALIZED DATA STORES
This section describes the general characteristics of data store-based platforms, i.e., smart home platforms that use a centralized data store to facilitate routines. Following this general description, we provide background on two such platforms, namely (1) Google's "Works with Nest" [34] platform (henceforth called "Nest") and
(2) the Philips Hue lighting system [37] (henceforth called "Hue"), which serve as the targets of our security analysis. While there are no ocial statistics on the market adoption of either Nest or Hue, the Android apps for both of the systems have over a million downloads on Google Play [16, 17] , indicating signicant adoption, and far-reaching security impact of our analysis. Figure 1 describes the general architecture of DSB platforms, consisting of three main components: apps, devices, and the centralized data store. These components generally communicate over the Internet. Additionally, a physical hub that facilitates local communication via protocols such as Zigbee or Z-wave may or may not be included in this setup (e.g., the Hue Bridge); i.e., in a general sense, routines are agnostic of the presence of the hub. Hence, we Figure 1 . Similarly, the apps may either be Web services hosted on the cloud, or mobile apps communicating via Web services. At this juncture, we generalize apps as third-party software interacting with the data store, and provide the specics for individual platforms in later sections. The centralized data store facilitates communication among apps and devices via state variables. The data store exposes two types of state variables: (1) Home state variables that reect the general state of the entire smart home (e.g., if the user is at home/away, the devices attached to the home, the postal code), and (2) Devicespecic state variables that reect the attributes specic to particular devices (e.g., if the Camera is streaming, the target temperature of the thermostat, the battery health of the smoke alarm).
General Characteristics
Apps and devices communicate by reading from or writing to the state variables in the centralized data store. This model allows expressive communication, from simple state updates to indirect trigger-action routines. Consider this simple state update: the user may change the temperature of the thermostat from an app, which in turn writes the change to the target temperature variable in the data store. The thermostat device receives an update from the data store (i.e., reads the target temperature state variable), and changes its target temperature accordingly. Further, as stated previously, expressive routines may also be implemented using the data store. For instance, the thermostat may change to its "economy" mode when the home's state changes to away. That is, the thermostat's app may detect that the user has left the smart home (e.g., using Geofencing), and write to the home state variable away. The thermostat may then read this change, and switch to its economy mode.
A salient characteristic of DSB platforms is that they lean towards seamless home automation, by automatically interacting with devices and executing complex routines via the centralized data store. However, even within platforms that follow this model (e.g., Samsung SmartThings, Nest, and Hue), our preliminary investigation led to the following key observations that motivate a targeted analysis of the Nest and Hue platforms and their apps: Key Observations: We observe that both Nest and SmartThings execute routines; however, there is a key dierence in how routines are managed. SmartThings allows users to create and manage routines from the SmartThings app itself, thereby providing users with a general view of all the routines executing in the home [44] . In contrast, Nest routines are generally implemented as decentralized third-party integrations. Third-party products that facilitate routines provide the user with the ability to view and manage them. As a result, the Nest platform does not provide the user with a centralized view of the routines that are in place. Due to this lack of user control, Nest smart homes may face unique security risks and challenges, which motivates this security analysis. Similarly, we observe that the Philips Hue platform may be another interesting variant of DSB platforms. That is, Hue integrates homogeneous devices related to lighting such as lamps and bulbs, unlike Nest and SmartThings that integrate heterogeneous devices, and represents a drastically simpler (and hence unique) variant of home automation platforms that use centralized data stores. As a result, the analysis of Hue's attack surface has potential to draw attention to other similar, homogeneous platforms, which is especially important considering the fragmentation in the smart home product ecosystem [6] . To A] structures: <structure 1 ID> away = "home" eta_begin = "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z" postal_code = "00000" thermostats our knowledge, this paper is the rst to analyze this relatively new class of smart home platforms, and specically, Nest and Hue.
Nest Background
The Works with Nest platform integrates a heterogenous set of devices, including devices from Nest (e.g., Nest thermostat, Nest Cam, Nest Protect) as well as from other brands (e.g., Wemo and Kasa switches, Google Home, MyQ Chamberlain garage door opener) [34] . This section describes the key characteristics of Nest, i.e., its data store, its access control model, and routines. Data store composition: Figure 2 shows a simplied, conceptual view of the centralized data store in Nest. Note that the gure shows a small fraction of the true data store, i.e., only enough to facilitate understanding. Nest implements the data store as a JSON-format document divided into two main top-level sections: structures and devices. A structure represents an entire smart home environment such as a user's home or oce, and is dened by various state variables that are global across the smart home (e.g., Away to indicate the presence or absence of the user in the structure and the postal_code to indicate the home's physical location). The devices are subdivided into device types (e.g., thermostats, cameras, smoke detectors), and there can be many devices of a certain type, as shown in Figure 2 . Each device stores its state in variables that are relevant to its type; e.g., a thermostat has state variables for humidity, and target_temperature_c, whereas a camera has the variables is_online and is_streaming. Aside from these type-specic variables, devices also have certain variables in common; e.g., the alphanumeric device ID, the structure ID of the structure in which the device is installed, the device's user-assigned name, and battery_health. Access Control in Nest.: Nest treats third-party apps, Web services, and devices that want to integrate with a Nest-based smart home as "products". Each Nest user account has a specic data store assigned to it and any product that requests access to the user's data store needs to be rst authorized by the user using OAuth 2.0. Nest denes read or read/write permissions for each of the variables in the data store. Additionally, some variables e.g., the list of all thermostats in the structure are always read-only. A product that wants to register with Nest must rst declare the permissions that it needs (e.g.,thermostat read, thermostat read/write) in the Nest developer console. When connecting a product to Nest, during the OAuth authorization phase, the user is shown the permissions requested by the product. Once the user grants the permissions, a revocable access token is generated specic to the product, the set of permissions requested, and the particular smart home to which the product is connected. This token is used for subsequent interactions with the data store.
Accessing the Nest data store.: Devices and applications that are connected to a particular smart home (i.e., the user's Nest account) can update data store variables to which they have access, and also subscribe to the changes to the state of the data store. Nest uses the REST approach for these update communications, as well as for apps/devices to modify the data store. The REST endpoints can be accessed through HTTPS by any registered Nest products. Routines in Nest: The ability of connected devices to observe and write to state variables in the centralized data store facilitates trigger-action routines. However, in Nest, the user cannot create or view routines in a centralized interface (i.e., unlike SmartThings). Instead, apps may provide routines as opt-in features. For example, the Nest smoke alarm's smoke_alarm_state variable has three possible values, "ok", "warning", and "emergency". When this variable is changed to "warning", other smart home products (e.g., Somfy Protect [26] ) can be congured to trigger and warn the user. Note that in the Home/Away assist section of the Nest app settings, users can view a summary of how certain variables (i.e., home or away) aect their Nest-manufactured devices; however, there is no way for users to observe the triggers/apps that change the state of the away variable simultaneously with the resultant actions, preventing them from fully understanding how routines execute in their home.
Hue Background
Unlike Nest, which is a platform for heterogeneous devices, Philips Hue deals exclusively with lighting devices such as lamps and bulbs. As a result, the centralized data store of Philips Hue supports much simpler routines. Hue implements its data store as a JSON document with sections related to (1) physical lighting devices, (2) semantic groups of these devices, and (3) global cong variables (such as whitelisted apps and the linkbutton). To connect a thirdparty management app to a user's existing Hue system, the app identies a Hue bridge connected to the local network, and requires the user to press a physical button on the bridge. Once this action is completed by the user, the app receives a username token that is stored in the whitelisted section of the Hue data store. Whitelisted apps can then read and modify data store variables as dictated by Hue's access control policy, which grants all authorized apps the same access regardless of their purported functionality. Our online appendix provides additional details regarding the Hue platform [1].
ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
This paper analyzes the security of home automation platforms that rely on centralized data stores (i.e., DSB platforms). Third-party apps are the security principals on such platforms, as they are assigned specic permissions to interact with the integrated devices. That is, as described in Section 2, DSB platforms consist of (1) third-party apps that interact with the smart home (i.e., centralized data store and devices) by acquiring (2) platform permissions, and execute a complex set of such interactions as (3) trigger-action routines. Our analysis methodology takes these three aspects into consideration, starting with platform permissions, as follows:
A. Analysis of Platform Permissions (Section 4): We analyze the enforcement of platform permissions/access control to discover inconsistencies. For this analysis, we automatically build permission maps, and semi-automatically analyze them. B. Analysis of Routines (Section 5): While analyzing permission enforcement gives us an idea of what individual devices can accomplish with a certain set of permissions, we perform an experimental analysis with real devices to identify the interdependencies among devices and apps through the shared data model, and the ramications of such interdependencies on the user's security and privacy. Additionally, we notice that Nest does not enforce transitive access control policies to prevent dangerous side-eects of routines, but instead employs a product review process as a defense mechanism. We analyze the eectiveness of this review process using the permission prompts used by existing apps as evidence. C. Analysis of Third-party Apps (Section 6): We analyze the permission descriptions presented by mobile apps compatible with Nest to identify over-privileged apps, or apps whose permission descriptions are inconsistent with the permission requested. We then analyze the apps for signs of SSL misuse, in order to exploit applications that possess critical permissions, which can be leveraged to indirectly exploit security critical devices in the smart home. We combine the ndings from these three analyses to demonstrate an instance of a lateral privilege escalation attack in a smart home (Section 7). That is, we demonstrate how an attacker can compromise a low-integrity device/app integrated into a smart home (e.g., a light bulb), and use routines to perform protected operations on a high-integrity product (e.g., a security camera).
EVALUATING PERMISSION ENFORCEMENT
The centralized data store described in Section 2 may contain variables whose secrecy or integrity is crucial; e.g., unprotected write access to the web_url eld of the camera may allow a malicious app to launch a phishing attack, by replacing the URL in the eld with an attacker-controlled one. To understand if appropriate barriers are in place to protect such sensitive variables, we perform an analysis of the permission enforcement in Nest and Hue.
Our approach is to generate and analyze the permission map for each platform, i.e., the variables that can be accessed with each permission, and inversely, the permissions needed to access each variable of the data store. Note that while this information should ideally be available in the platform documentation, prior analysis of similar systems has demonstrated that the documentation may not always be complete or correct in this regard [10, 12] .
Generating Permission Maps
We generate the permission map using automated testing as in prior work on Android [10] . We use two separate approaches for Nest and Hue, owing to their disparate access control models. Approach for Nest: We rst created a simulated home environment using the Nest Home Simulator [33], and linked our Nest user account to this simulated smart home. We then created our test Android app, and connected our test app to the simulated home (i.e., our Nest user account) as described in Section 2.2. Note that the simulated smart home is virtually identical to an end-user's setup, such that real devices may be added to it. Using the simulator allows us to investigate the data store information of Nest devices (e.g., the Smoke/CO detector) that we may not have installed.
In order to generate a complete view of the data store, we granted our test app all of the 15 permissions in Nest (e.g.,Away read/write, Thermostat read), and read all accompanying information. To build the permission map for Nest's 15 permissions, we created 15 apps, such that each app requested a single unique permission, and registered these apps to our developer account in the Nest developer console. Note that we do not test the eect of permission combinations, as our goal is to test the enforcement of individual permissions, and Nest's simple authorization logic simply provides an app with a union of the privileges of the individual permissions.
We then connected each of the 15 apps to our Nest user account using the procedure described in Section 2.2. We programmed each app to attempt to read and write each variable of the data store (i.e., the previously derived complete view). We recorded the outcome of each access, i.e., if it was successful, or an access control denial.
In the cases where we experienced non-security errors writing to data store variables (e.g., writing data with an incorrect type), we revised our apps and repeated the test. The outcome of this process was a permission map, i.e., the mapping of each permission to the data store variables that it can read and/or write. Approach for Hue: We followed the procedure for Hue described in Section 2.3 to get a unique token that registers our single test app with the data store of our Hue bridge. In Hue, all the variables of the data store are "readable" (i.e., we veried that all the variables described in the developer documentation [38] can be read by third-party apps). Therefore, to build the permission map, we rst extracted the contents of the entire data store. Then, for each subsection within the data store, our app made repeated write requests, i.e., PUT calls with the payload consisting of a dummy value based on the variable type (i.e., String, Boolean and Integer). All the variables that were successfully written to using this method were assigned as "writable" variables. Similarly, our app made repeated DELETE calls to the API and the variables that were successfully deleted were assigned as "writable" variables. This generated permission map applies to all third-party apps connected to Hue, since the platform provides equal privilege to all third-party apps.
Analyzing Permission Maps
The objective behind obtaining the permission map is to understand the potential for application overprivilege, by analyzing the granularity as well as the correctness of the enforcement. We analyze the permission map to identify instances of (1) coarse-grained permissions, i.e., permissions that give the third-party app access to a set of security-sensitive resources that must ideally be protected under separate permissions, and (2) incorrect enforcement, i.e., when an app has access to more resources (i.e., state variables) than it should have given its permission set, as per the documentation; e.g., apps on SmartThings may lock/unlock the door lock without the explicit permission required to do so [12] .
To perform this analysis, we rst identied data store variables that may be security or privacy-sensitive. This identication was performed using an open-coding methodology by one author, and separately veried by another author, for each platform. We then performed further analysis by separately considering each such variable, and the permission(s) that allow access to it. A major consideration in our analysis is the security impact of an adversary being allowed read or read/write access to a particular resource. Moreover, our evaluation of the impact of the access control enforcement was contextualized to the platform under inspection. That is, when evaluating Nest, we took into consideration the semantic meaning and purpose of certain permissions in terms of the data store variables, as described in the documentation (e.g., that the Away read/write permission should be required to write to the away variable [28] ). For Hue, we only considered the securityimpact of an adversary accessing data store variables. Our rationale is that the Hue platform denes the same static policy (i.e., same permissions) for all third-party apps, and hence, its permission map can be simply said to consist of just one permission that provides access to a xed set of data store variables. As a result, we judge application over-privilege in Hue by considering the impact of an adversarial third-party app reading from or writing to each of the security-sensitive variables identied in Hue's permission map.
The creation of the permission maps for both Nest and Hue requires the application of well-studied automated testing techniques, and as such, can be replicated for similar platforms, with minor changes to input data (e.g., the permissions to test for). We will release our code and data to developers and platform vendors.
Permission Enforcement Findings
Finding 1: The permission enforcement in Nest is ne-grained and correctly enforced, i.e., as per the specication (F 1 ). We observe that the Nest permission map is signicantly more negrained, and permissions are correctly enforced, relative to the observations of prior research in similar platforms (e.g., the analysis of SmartThings [12] ). Some highly sensitive variables are always read-only (e.g., the web_url where the camera feed is posted), and there are separate read and read/write permissions to access sensitive variables. Variables that control the state of the entire smart home are protected by dedicated permissions that control write privilege; e.g., the away variable can only be written to using the Away read/write permission, the ETA variable has separate permissions for apps to read and write to it (i.e., ETA read and ETA write), and the Nest Cam can only be turned on/o via the is_streaming variable, using the Camera + Images read/write permission that controls write access to it. Moreover, since many apps need to respond to the away variable (i.e., react when the user is home/away), device-specic read permissions (e.g., Thermostat read, Smoke + CO read) also allow apps to read the away variable, eliminating the need for apps to ask for higher-privileged Away read permission. The separate read and read/write permissions are correctly enforced, i.e.,our generated permission map provides the same access as is dened in the Nest permission documentation [28] . This is in contrast with ndings of similar analyses of permission models in the past (e.g., the Android permission model [10] , SmartThings [12] ), and demonstrates that the Nest platform has incorporated lessons from prior work in permission enforcement. Finding 2: In Hue, the access control policy allows apps to bypass the user's explicit consent (F 2 ). We discovered two data store variables that were not write-protected, and which have a signicant part to play in controlling access to the data store and the user's smart home. First, any third-party app can write to the linkbutton ag. Recall from Section 2.3 that the user has to press the physical button on the Hue bridge device to authorize an app's addition to the bridge. The physical button press changes the linkbutton value to "true", and allows the app to be added to the whitelist of allowed third-party apps. However, we discovered that once installed, an app can toggle the linkbutton variable at will, enabling third-party apps to add other third-party apps to the smart home without the user's consent. This exploitable access control vulnerability can allow an app with seemingly useful functionality to install malicious add-ons by bypassing the user altogether. In our tests, we veried this attack with apps that were connected to the local network. This condition is feasible as a malicious app that needs to be added without the user's consent may not even have to pretend to work with Hue; all it needs is to be connected to the local network (i.e., a game on the mobile device from one of the people present in the smart home). Note that it is also possible to remotely perform this attack, which we discuss in Section 10. Finding 3. In Hue, third-party apps can directly modify the list of added apps, adding and revoking access without user consent (F 3 ). Hue stores the authorization tokens of apps connected to the particular smart home in a whitelist on the Hue Bridge device. While analyzing the permission map, we discovered that not only could our third-party test app read from this list, it could also directly delete tokens from it. We experimentally conrmed this nding again, by removing Alexa and Google Home from the smart home, without the user's consent. An adversary could easily combine this vulnerability with (F 2 ), to remove legitimate apps added by the user, add adversary-controlled apps (i.e., by keeping the linkbutton "true"), all without the user's consent. More importantly, users do not get alerts when such changes are made (i.e., since it is assumed that the enforcement will correctly acquire user consent). Hence, unless the user actually checks the list of integrated apps using the Hue Web app, the user would not notice these changes.
While the Nest permission model is robust in its mapping of data store variables and permissions required to access them, Section 5 demonstrates how elds disallowed by permissions may be indirectly modied via strategic misuse of routines, and describes Nest's product review guidelines to prevent the same [30] . Section 6 describes how badly written and overprivileged apps escape these review guidelines, and motivate a technical solution.
EVALUATING SMART HOME ROUTINES
Prior work has demonstrated that in platforms that favor application interoperability but lack transitive access control enforcement, problems such as confused deputy and application collusion may persist [5, 11, 21, 22] . Smart homes that facilitate routines are no dierent, but the exploitability and impact of routines on smart homes is unknown, which motivates this aspect of our study.
Recall that routines are trigger-action programs that are either triggered by a change in some variable of the data store, or whose action modies certain variables of the data store. While both Nest and Hue share this characteristic, routines in Hue are fairly limited in scope, and their exploitation is bound to only aect the lighting of the smart home. As a result, while we provide conrmed examples of Hue routines in Section 2.3, the security evaluation described in this section is focused on the heterogeneous Nest platform that facilitates more diverse and expressive routines.
Methodology for the Analysis of Routines
While using the simulator as described in Section 4 allows us to understand what routines are possible on the platform, i.e., what variables might be manipulated, and what Nest devices (e.g., the Nest Cam, Nest Thermostat) are aected as a result, we performed additional experiments with real apps and devices to study existing routines in the wild. For this experiment, we extended the smart home setup previously discussed in Section 4 with real devices.
We started by collecting a list of devices that integrate with Nest from the Works with Nest website [34] . Using this initial list and information from the website, we purchased a set of 7 devices that possessed a set of characteristics relevant to this study, i.e., devices that (1) take part in routines (i.e., as advertised on the website), (2) are important for the user's security or privacy, and (3) are widely-known/popular with a large user base (i.e., determined by the number of installs of the mobile client on Google Play). We obtained a nal list of devices (7 real and 2 simulated) to our Nest smart home, namely, the Nest Cam (i.e., a security camera), Hue light bulb, Belkin Wemo switch, the MyQ Chamberlain garage door opener, TP Link Kasa Smart Plug, Google Home, Alexa, Nest Thermostat (simulated), and the Nest Protect Smoke & CO Alarm (simulated). Some devices that may be important for security did not participate in routines at the time of the study, and hence were excluded from our nal device list.
We connected these devices to our Nest smart home using the Android apps provided by device vendors, and connected a small set of smart home managers (e.g., Yeti [53] and Yonomi [54] ) to our Nest smart home as well. For each device, we set up and executed each individual routine as described on the Works with Nest as well as the device vendor's website, and observed the eects on the rest of the smart home (especially, security-sensitive devices). Also, we manipulated data store variables from our test app, and observed the eects on previously congured routines and devices.
Smart Home Routine Findings
Finding 4. Third-party apps that do not have the permission to turn on/o the Nest Cam directly, can do so by modifying the away variable (F 4 ). The Nest Cam is a home monitoring device, and important for the users' security. The is_streaming variable of the Nest Cam controls whether the camera is on (i.e., streaming) or o, and can only be written to by an app with the permission Camera r/w. The Nest Cam provides a routine as a feature, which allows the camera to be automatically switched on when the user leaves the home (i.e., when the away variable of the smart home is set to "away"), and switched o when the user returns (i.e., when away is set to "home"). Leveraging this routine, third-party apps such as the Belkin Wemo switch can manipulate the away eld, and indirectly aect the Nest Cam, without having explicit permission to do so. We tested this ability with our test app (see Section 4) as well, which could indirectly switch the camera on and o at will. This problem has serious consequences; e.g., a malicious test app with the away r/w permission may set the variable to "home" when the user is away to prevent the camera from recording a burglary.
The key problem here is that a low-integrity device/app can trigger a change in a high-integrity device indirectly, i.e., by modifying a Figure 3 : The Keen Home app asks the user to modify the thermostat's mode, but in reality, this action leads to the entire smart home being set to "home" mode, which aects a number of other devices.
variable it relies on, which is an instance of the well-known information ow integrity problem. Moreover, this is not the only instance of a high-integrity routine that relies on away; e.g., the Nest x Yale Lock can lock automatically when the home changes to away mode [25] , leakSMART reads the away state of the home and can notify the user's emergency contact when a leak occurs [24] .
Nest has a basic defense to prevent such issues: application design policies that apply to apps with more than 50 users [30] . App developers are required to submit their app for a product review to the Nest team once the app reaches 50 users, and a violation of the rather strict and detailed review guidelines can result in the app being rejected from using the Nest API. One of the review policies (i.e., specically policy 5.8) states that "Products that modify Home-/Away state automatically without user conrmation or direct user action will be rejected. " [30] . Nest users may be vulnerable in spite of this defense, for two reasons. First, as attacking a smart home is an attack on a user's personal space, it is feasible to assume that most attacks that exploit routines will be targeted (e.g., to perform burglaries). Assuming that the adversary can use social engineering to get the user to connect a malicious app to their Nest setup, a targeted attack on a specic user will succeed in spite of the policy, as the app would be developed solely for the targeted user and hence will have <50 users, and be exempt from the Nest product review. Second, it is unclear how apps are checked against this policy; our next nding demonstrates a signicant omission in Nest's review. Finding 5. Nest's product review policies dictate that the apps must prompt users before modifying away , but there is no ocial constraint on what the prompt may display (F 5 ). Consider the example in Figure 3 , which shows one such prompt by the Keen Home app [23] when the user tries to change the temperature of the thermostat. That is, when the user tries to change the temperature of the thermostat while the away variable is set to "away", the app requires us to change it to "home" before the thermostat temperature can be changed. This condition is entirely unnecessary to change the temperature. More importantly, it presents the prompt to the user in a way that states that the home/away modes are specic to the HVAC alone. This is in contrast to the actual functionality of these modes, in which a change to the away variable aects the entire smart home; i.e., we conrmed that the Nest Cam gets turned o as well once we agree to the prompt. It is important to note that the Keen Home app has passed the Nest product review, as it has well over 50 users (1K+ downloads on Google Play [15] ). Therefore, this case demonstrates that the Nest product review does not consider the contents of the prompt, and a malicious app may easily misinform the user and make them trigger the away variable to the app's advantage. Finally, in Section 6.1 we demonstrate that this problem of misinforming the user is not just limited to runtime in-app prompts described in this section, but extends to application-dened install-time permission descriptions (F 6 !F 9 ).
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF NEST APPS
In this Section, we investigate the privileges of apps developed to be integrated with Nest. Unlike prior work [12] , we not only report the permissions requested by apps, but also analyze the information prompts displayed to the user when requesting the permission. Additionally, we analyze the rate of SSL misuse by both general smart home management apps as well as apps integrated with Nest. For this section, we do not consider the Hue platform as it has a limited ecosystem of apps as compared to Nest. We derived two datasets to perform the analyses that we describe in this section, the Apps ener al dataset, which contains 650 smart home management apps extracted from Google Play, and the Apps nest dataset, which includes 39 apps that integrate into the Nest platform. Our online appendix [1] details our dataset collection methodologies.
Application Permission Descriptions
On Nest, developers provide permission descriptions that explain how an app uses a permission while registering their apps in the Nest developer console. These developer-provided descriptions are the only direct source of information available to the user to understand why an app requires a particular permission, i.e., Nest itself only provides a short and generic permission "title" phrase that is displayed to the user along with the developer-dened description (e.g., for Thermostat read, the Nest phrase is "See the temperature and settings on your thermostat(s)"). Owing to their signicant role in the user's understanding of the permission requirements, we analyze the correctness of such developer-dened descriptions relative to the permissions requested.
6.1.1 Analysis Methodology. As described in Section 2, upon registering permissions at the developer console, developers are granted an OAuth URL that they can direct the user to for obtaining an access token. As a result, permissions are not encoded in the client mobile app or Web app (i.e., unlike Android), which makes the task of extracting permissions dicult. However, we observe that the permissions that an app asks for are always displayed to the user for approval (i.e., when rst connecting an app to their Nest smart home using OAuth). We leverage this observation to obtain permissions dynamically, i.e., by executing apps to the point of integrating them with our Nest smart home, and recording the permission prompt displayed for the user's approval. The procedure is the same for mobile as well as Web apps.
6.1.2 Nest App Findings (F 6 !F 9 ). The two permissions that dominate the permission count are Away read/write and Thermostat read-/write, requested by 20 and 24 apps respectively, from the Apps nest dataset. Our online appendix [1] provides the permission count for all other permissions. Our ndings are as follows: 1. Home alerts "thermostat read/write: Allows Home alerts to notify you when the Nest temperature exceeds your threshold(s)" 2. Home alerts "away read/write: Allows Home Alerts to notify you when someone is in your home while in away-mode" 3. MyQ Chamberlain "thermostat read/write: Allows Chamberlain to display your Nest Thermostat temperature in the MyQ app" 4. leakSMART "thermostat read/write: Allows leakSMART to show Nest Thermostat room temperature and humidity. New HVAC sensor mode will notify you to shut o your thermostat if a leak is detected in your HVAC system. " 5. Simplehuman Mirror "Camera+Images read/write: Allow your simplehuman sensor mirror pro to capture and recreate the light your Nest Cam sees" 6. Iris by Lowe's "structure read/write: View your Nest Structure names so Iris can help you pair your Nest Structures to the correct Iris Places" 7. Heatworks model 1 "away read/write: Allows the Heatworks MODEL 1 to be placed into vacation mode to save on power consumption while you're away" 8. Feather Controller "Camera+Images read/write: Allows Feather to show you your camera and activity images. Additionally, Feather will allow you to request a snapshot. " 9. Heatworks model 1 "thermostat r/w: Allows your Heatworks MODEL 1 water heater to go into vacation mode when your home is set to away"
VC2: Describing Away as a property of the thermostat alone, rather than something that aects the entire smart home 10. Gideon "away read/write: Allows Gideon to read and update the Away state of your thermostat" 11. Muzzley "away read/write: Allows Muzzley to read and update the Away state of your thermostat" 12. Keen home smart vent "away read/write: Allows Smart vent to read the state of your Thermostat and change the state from Away to Home" VC3: Both VC1 and VC2
13.
WeMo "away read/write: Allows your WeMo products to turn o when your Nest Thermostat is set to Away and on when set to Home. " 14. IFTTT thermostat service "thermostat read/write: Now you can turn on Nest Thermostat Applets that monitor when you're home, away and when the temperature changes. "
VC4: Descriptions that do not relate to the permission 15. IFTTT thermostat service "away read/write: Now you can set your temperature or turn on the fan with Nest Thermostat Applets on IFTTT" 16. Life360
"away read/write: We need this permission to automatically turn on/o your nest system" Figure 4 : An example from the Nest documentation on OAuth authorization [29] that displays a permission description violation (specically, VC1) for the Away r/w and Camera + images r/w permissions. The developer's permission description indicates that the FTL Lights only need to read data store variables, in both cases. Finding 6. A signicant number of apps provide incorrect permission descriptions, which may misinform users (F 6 ). As shown in Table 1 , we found a total of 15 permission description violations in 13/39 apps from the Apps nest dataset. We classify these incorrect descriptions into 5 violation categories (i.e., VC1 ! VC4), based on the specic manner in which they misinform the user, such as requesting more privileges than required for the described need (e.g., read/write permissions when only reading is required), or misrepresenting the eect of the use of the permission (e.g., stating Away as aecting only the thermostat). That is, over 33.33% of the apps we could integrate have violating permission descriptions. Finding 7. In most cases of violations, apps request read/write permissions instead of read (F 7 ). In 9 cases, apps request the more privileged read/write version of the permission, when they should have clearly requested the read version, as per their permission description (i.e., VC1 in Table 1 ). For example, consider the "MyQ Chamberlain" app (Table 1, entry 3) , which asks for the thermostat read/write permission, but whose description only suggests the need for the thermostat read permission, i.e., "Allows Chamberlain to display your Nest Thermostat temperature in the MyQ app". More importantly, a majority of the violations of this kind occur for the Away read/write and Camera+Images read/write permissions, which may have serious consequences if these overprivileged apps are compromised, i.e., as Away read/write regulates control over indicating whether a user is at home or out of the house, and Camera+Images read/write may allow apps to turn o the Nest cam via the is_streaming variable. These violations exist in spite of Nest guidelines that mention the following as a Key Point: "Choose 'read' permissions when your product needs to check status. Choose 'read/write' permissions to get status checks and to write data values. " [28] . Finally, we found that the Nest documentation may itself have incorrect instructions, e.g., the Nest's documentation on OAuth 2.0 authentication [29] shows an example permission prompt that incorrectly requests the Away read/write permission while only needing read access, i.e., with the description "FTL Lights turn o when the room is empty", as shown in the Figure 4 . Finding 8. The Nest product review is insucient when it comes to reviewing the correctness of permission descriptions and requests by apps (F 8 ). The Nest product review suggests the following two rules, violating which may cause apps to be rejected: (1) "3.3. Products with names, descriptions, or permissions not relevant to the functionality of the product", and (2) "3.5. Products that have permissions that don't match the functionality oered by the products" [30] . Our ndings demonstrate that the 16 violations discovered violate either one or both of these rules (e.g., by requesting read/write permissions, when the app only requires read). The fact that the apps are still available suggests that the Nest product review may not be rigorously enforced, and as a result, may be insucient in protecting the attacks discovered in Section 5. Finding 9. Apps often incorrectly describe the Away eld as a local eld of the Nest thermostat, which is misleading (F 9 ). One example of this kind (VC2 in Table 1 ) is the Keen Home app described in Section 5 (Table 1 . entry 12), which states that it needs Away read/write in order to "Allow Smart vent to read the state of your Thermostat and change the state from Away to Home". As a result, Keen Home misrepresents the eect and signicance of writing to the Away eld, by making it seem like Away is a variable of the thermostat, instead of a eld that aects numerous devices in the entire smart home. Gideon and Muzzley (entries 10 and 11 in Table 1 ) present a similar anomaly. Our hypothesis is that such violations occur because Nest originally started as a smart thermostat that gradually evolved into a smart home platform.
Finally, in addition to misleading descriptions classied as VC1 and VC2, we discovered apps whose permission descriptions did not relate to the permissions requested at all (VC4), and apps whose descriptions satised both VC1 and VC2 (i.e., VC3 in Table 1 ). The accuracy of permission descriptions is important, as the user has no other source of information upon which to base their decision to trust an app. Nest recognizes this, and hence, makes permissions and descriptions a part of its product review. The discovery of inaccurate descriptions not only demonstrates that apps may be overprivileged, but also that Nest's design review process is incomplete, as it puts all its importance on getting the user's consent via permission prompts (e.g., in Findings 5!9), but not on what information is actually shown.
Application SSL Use
The previous section demonstrated that smart home apps may be overprivileged in spite of a dedicated product review. An adversary may be able to compromise the smart home by exploiting vulnerabilities in such overprivileged apps. As a result, we decided to empirically derive an estimate of how vulnerable smart home apps are, in terms of their use of SSL APIs, which form an important portion of the apps' attack surface.
We used two datasets for this experiment, i.e., the Apps ener al dataset consisting of 650 generic smart home (Android) apps crawled from Google Play, and an extended version of the Apps nest dataset, i.e., the Apps nest Ext dataset, which consists of 111 Android apps built for Works with Nest devices (i.e., including the ones for which we do not possess devices). We analyzed each app from both the datasets using MalloDroid [9] , to discover common SSL aws. Finding 10. A signicant percentage of general smart home management apps, as well as apps that connect to Nest have serious SSL vulnerabilities (F 10 ). 20.61% (i.e., 134/650) of the smart home apps from the Apps ener al dataset, and 19.82% (i.e., 22/111) apps from the Apps nest Ext dataset, have at least one SSL violation as agged by MalloDroid. Specically, in the Apps nest Ext dataset, the most common cause of an SSL vulnerability is a broken TrustManager that accepts all certicates (i.e., 20 violations), followed by a broken HostNameVerier that does not verify the hostname of a valid certicate (i.e., 11 violations). What is particularly worrisome is that apps such as MyQ Chamberlain and Wemo have multiple SSL vulnerabilities as well as the Away read/write permission, which makes their compromise especially dangerous. In the next section, we demonstrate an end-to-end attack on the Nest security camera, using one of the SSL vulnerabilities discovered from this analysis, and the NestAway read/write permission.
LATERAL PRIVILEGE ESCALATION
While our ndings from the previous sections are individually signicant, we demonstrate that they can be combined to form an instance of a lateral privilege escalation attack [39] , in the context of smart homes. That is, we demonstrate how an adversary can compromise one product (device/app) integrated into a smart home, and escalate privileges to perform protected operations on another product, leveraging routines congured via the centralized data store.
This attack is interesting in the context of smart homes, because of two core assumptions that it relies on (1) low-integrity (or non-security) smart home products may be easier to directly compromise than high-integrity devices such as the Nest Cam (i.e., none of the SSL vulnerabilities in F 10 were in security-sensitive apps), and (2) while low-integrity devices may not be able to directly modify the state of high-integrity devices (F 1 ), they may be able to indirectly do so via automated routines triggered by global smart home variables (F 4 ). (3) Moreover, since the low-integrity device is not being intentionally malicious, but is compromised, the product review process would not be useful, even if it was eective (which it is not, as demonstrated by F 5 !F 9 ). This last point distinguishes a lateral privilege escalation from actions of malicious apps that trigger routines (e.g., the "fake alarm attack" discussed in prior work [12] ). These conditions make lateral privilege escalation particularly interesting in the context of smart home platforms. Attack Scenario and Threat Model: We consider a common manin-the-middle (MiTM) scenario, similar to the SSL-exploitation scenarios that motivate prior work [9, 41] . Consider Alice, a smart home user who has congured a security camera to record when she is away (i.e., using the away variable in the centralized data store). Bob is an acquaintance (e.g., a disgruntled employee or an ex-boyfriend) whose motive is to steal a valuable from Alice's house without being recorded by the camera. We assume that Bob also knows that Alice uses a smart switch in her home, and controls it via its app, which is integrated with Alice's smart home. Bob follows Alice, and connects to the same public network as her (e.g., a coee shop, common workplace), snis the access token sent by the switch's app to its server using a known SSL vulnerability in the app, and then uses the token to directly control the away variable. Setting the away to "home" confuses the security camera into thinking that Alice is at home, and it stops recording. Bob can now burglarize the house without being recorded. The Attack: The example scenario described previously can be executed on a Nest smart home, using the Nest Cam and the TP Link Kasa switch (and the accompanying Kasa app). We compromise the SSL connection of Kasa app, which was found to contain a broken SSL TrustManager in our analysis described in Section 6. We choose Kasa app as it requests the sensitive Away read/write permission, and has a sizable user base (1M+ downloads on Google Play [14] ). It is interesting to note that the Kasa app has also passed the Nest product review process and is advertised on the Works with Nest website [31] , but can still be leveraged to perform an attack. We use bettercap [2] as a MiTM proxy to intercept and modify unencrypted data. Additionally, as described in the attack scenario, we assume that (1) the victim's Nest smart home has the Nest Cam and the Kasa switch installed, (2) the popular routine which triggers the Nest Cam to stop recording when the user is home is enabled, and (3) the user connects her smartphone to a network to which the attacker has access (e.g., coee shop, oce), which is a common assumption when exploiting SSL-misuse [9, 41] .
The attack proceeds as follows: (1) The user utilizes the Kasa app to control the switch, while the user's mobile device is connected Listing 1: The Kasa app's unencrypted GET request.
1
{"data":{"uri":"com.tplinkra.iot.authentication.impl. RetrieveAccountSettingRequest"}, 2 "iotContext": 3
{"userContext":{"accountToken":"<anonymized alphanumeric token>", 4
"app":{"appType":"Kasa_Android"}, 5
"email":"<anonymized>", 6
"terminalId":"<anonymized>"}}, ...
to public network.
(2) The attacker uses a MiTM proxy to intercept Kasa app's attempt to contact its own server, and supplies the attacker's certicate to the app during the SSL handshake, which is accepted by the Kasa app due to the faulty TrustManager.
(3) The Kasa app then sends an authorization token (see Listing 1) to the MiTM proxy (i.e., assuming it is the authenticated server), which is stolen by the attacker. This token authorizes a particular client app to send commands to the TP Link server. (4) Using the stolen token, the attacker instructs the TP Link server to set the smart home's away variable to the value "home", while the user is actually "away". This action is possible as the TP Link server (i.e., Web app) has the -Away read/write permission for the user's Nest smart home. (5) This triggers the routine in the Nest Cam, which stops recording. In sum, the attacker compromises a security-insensitive (i.e., lowintegrity) product in the system, and uses it along with a routine to escalate privileges, i.e., to modify the state of a security-sensitive (i.e., high-integrity) product. It should be noted that while this is one veried instance of a lateral privilege escalation attack on DSB smart home platforms, given the broad attack surface indicated by our ndings, it is likely that similar undiscovered attacks exist.
LESSONS
Our ndings (F 1 )!(F 10 ) demonstrate numerous gaps in the security of smart home platforms that implement routines using centralized data stores. Moreover, while many of the ndings may apply to platforms such as SmartThings as well, their implications are more serious on Nest, as the user does not have a centralized perspective of the routines programmed into the smart home. We now distill the core lessons from our ndings: Lesson 1 : Seamless automation must be accompanied by strong integrity guarantees. It is important to note that the attack described in Section 7 may not be addressed by xing the problem of overprivilege or via product reviews, since none of the components of the attack are overprivileged (i.e., including TP Link Kasa), and our ndings demonstrate that the Nest product review is insucient (F 5 !F 9 ). The attack was enabled due to the integrity-agnostic execution of routines in Nest (F 4 ). To mitigate such attacks, platforms such as Nest need information ow control (IFC) enforcement that ensures strong integrity guarantees [3] , and future work may explore the complex challenges of (1) specifying integrity labels for a diverse set of user devices and (2) enforcing integrity constraints without sacricing automation. The introduction of tiered-trust domains in Nest (i.e., via Weave) oers an encouraging start to the incorporation of integrity guarantees into smart home platforms [27]. Lesson 2: Nest Product Reviews would benet from at least lightweight static analysis. Our ndings demonstrate numerous violations of the Nest design policies that should have been discovered during the product review. Moreover, the review guidelines also state that products that do not securely transmit tokens will be rejected [30] , but our simple static analysis using MalloDroid discovered numerous SSL vulnerabilities in Nest apps (F 10 ), of which one can be exploited (Section 7). We recommend the integration of light-weight tools such as MalloDroid in the review process. Lesson 3: The security of the smart home indirectly depends on the smart phone (apps). Smartphone apps have been known to be susceptible to SSL misuse [9] , among other security issues (e.g., unprotected interfaces [5] ). Thus, unprotected smartphone clients for smart home devices may enable the attacker to gain access to the smart home, and launch further attacks, as demonstrated in Section 7. Ensuring the security of smart phone apps is a hard problem, but future work may triage smartphone apps for security analyses based on the volume of smart home devices/platforms they integrate with, thereby, improving the apps that oer the widest possible attack surface to the adversary. Lesson 4: Popular but simpler platforms need urgent attention. The startling gaps in the access control of Hue demonstrate that the access control of other simple (i.e., homogeneous) platforms may benet from a similar holistic security analysis (F 2 , F 3 ).
VULNERABILITY REPORTING
We have reported the discovered vulnerabilities to Philips (F 2 , F 3 ), Google (F 1 , F 4 !F 9 ), and TP Link (F 10 ). TP Link has since xed the SSL aw in the latest version of the app. Philips Hue is currently analyzing third party apps for the specic behavior discussed in this paper, and will eventually roll out a x to their access control policy. We have also provided recommendations to Google on improving the safety of routines, which is a design challenge that may be hard to immediately address.
THREATS TO VALIDITY
1. SSL MiTM for dierent Android versions: Our attack described in Section 7 has been tested and is fully functional on a Nexus 7 device running Android version 4.4.2. However, we have recently observed that the MiTM proxy is blocked when intercepting connections from a Pixel 2 device running the latest version of Android (i.e., 8.1.0). Our hypothesis is that the TP Link Kasa app changes its SSL API use based on the Android API version, and we are currently working on locating at what Android version (i.e., between 4.4.2 and 8.1.0) the SSL component of our described attack no longer functions. However, this caveat does not change the fact that our attack is feasible under certain settings, or that thirdparty Android apps may often have exploitable SSL aws [9, 36, 41] . SSL misuse is not the focal point of the lateral privilege escalation exploit we describe, which occurs primarily because of routines implemented using shared global variables in Nest (F 4 !F 6 ).
Number of devices and apps:
For the analysis in Section 6, our set of 9 devices (i.e., 7 real and 2 virtual) allowed us to integrate a set of 39 apps into our Nest platform (i.e., the Apps nest dataset), out of the around 130 "Works with" Nest apps we found. Therefore, while we cannot say that our ndings (F 6 !F 9 ) generalize to all the apps compatible with Nest, we can certainly say that they are valid for a signicant minority (i.e., over 27%).
Local and Remote exploits of Hue:
Our exploits for the Philips Hue platform demonstrated in Section 4 (F 2 and F 3 ) can be executed from an app operating on the same local network as the Hue bridge. This is feasible, as the attacker-controlled app simply needs to be on the same network (i.e., not even on the victim's device). The vulnerabilities we describe may also be remotely exploited, as access control enforcement remains the same for remote access.
RELATED WORK
Smart home platforms are an extension of the new modern OS paradigm, the security problems in smart home platforms are similar to prior modern OSes (e.g., application over-privilege, incorrect platform enforcement). As a result, some of the same techniques may be applied in detecting such problems. For instance, in a manner similar to Felt et al. 's seminal evaluation of Android permission enforcement [10] , our work uses automated testing to derive permission maps and compares the maps to the platform documentation. We also leverage lessons from prior work on SSL misuse [9, 36, 41, 45] to perform the SSL Analysis (Section 6.2) and the MiTM exploit (Section 7). The lack of transitivity in access control that we observe is similar to prior observations on Android [5, 7, 11, 21, 22] . However, the implications of intransitive enforcement are dierent in the smart home space, and, to our knowledge, some of the key analyses performed in this paper is novel across modern OS research (e.g., exploitation of home automation routines and the ineectiveness of Nest's product review). The novelty of this paper is rooted in using lessons learned from prior research in modern OS and application security to identify problems in popular but under-evaluated platforms such as Nest and Hue, and moreover, in demonstrating the potential misuse of home automation routines for performing lateral privilege escalation.
In the area of smart home security, the investigation by Fernandez et al. [12] into the SmartThings platforms and its apps is highly related to the study presented in this paper. However, our work exhibits key dierences. For instance, the platforms explored in this paper (i.e., Nest and Hue) are popular, and have key dierences relative to SmartThings (Section 2). Moreover, while Fernandez et al. focus on application overprivilege, this work studies the utility and security of routines, and leverages routines to demonstrate the rst instance of lateral privilege escalation on smart home platforms. Our analysis of permission text artifacts, product review-based defense in Nest, and SSL-misuse in apps leads to novel ndings that facilitate the end-to-end attack. Finally, we demonstrate that simpler platforms (i.e., Hue) fail to provide bare-minimum protections.
Aside from this closely-related work, prior work has demonstrated direct attacks on smart home platforms and applications. For instance, Sukhvir et al. attack the communication and authentication protocols in Hue and Wemo [35] , Sivaraman et al. attack the home's rewall using a malicious device on the network [42] , and a Veracode study demonstrated issues in a range of products such as the MyQ Garage System and Wink Relay [51] . Our work performs a holistic security evaluation of the access control enforcement in DSB platforms (i.e., Nest and Hue) and their applications, and is complementary to such per-device security analysis.
Prior work has also analyzed the security of trigger-action programs. Surbatovich et al. [47] analyzed the security and privacy risks associated with IFTTT recipes, which are trigger-action programs similar to routines. The key dierence is that Surbatovich et al. examines the safety of individual recipes, while our work explores routines that may be safe on their own (e.g., when home, turn o the Nest Cam), but which may be used as gadgets by attackers to attack a high-integrity device from a low-integrity device.
In a similar vein, Celik et al. [4] presented Soteria, a static analysis system that detects side-eects of concurrent execution of Samsung's smart apps. The problem explored in our paper is broadly similar to Celik et al. 's work, i.e., both papers explore problems that arise due to the lack of transitive access control in smart homes. While the techniques that underlie Soteria have advanced the state of the art for analyzing smart home products, our paper exhibits two key dierences that demonstrate the novelty of our analysis. First, Soteria does not aim to address the adversarial use of routines as mechanisms to perform a lateral privilege escalation. As a result, it would not detect the attack discussed in Section 7, since the precondition for the attack is not a routine (i.e., it is the exploitation of SSL vulnerability in the Kasa app, which allows us to steal the authorization token and misuse the away permission allocated to Kasa). Second, this paper is novel in its analysis of runtime prompts and permission descriptions on home automation platforms, and uncovers problems in how users are informed of specic sensitive automation actions (F 8 !F 9 ), and how the permissions that enable such actions (F 5 ) are described.
Finally, prior work has proposed novel access control enhancements, which may alleviate some of the concerns raised in this paper. ProvThings [52] provides provenance information that may allow the user to piece together evidence of some of the attacks described in this paper, but does not prevent the attacks themselves. On the contrary, ContextIoT [19] provides users with runtime prompts describing the context of sensitive data accesses, which may alert users to unintended execution of routines (F 4 ), at the cost of reducing automation. Further, SmartAuth [50] analyzes the consistency of application descriptions with code, and may benet the Nest product review in determining the correctness of permission descriptions.
CONCLUSION
Smart home platforms and devices operate in the users' physical space, hence, evaluating their security is critical. This paper evaluates the security of two such platforms, Nest and Hue, that implement home automation routines via centralized data stores. We systematically analyze the limitations of the access control enforced by Nest and Hue, the exploitability of routines in Nest, the robustness of Nest's product review, and the security of thirdparty apps that integrate with Nest. Our analysis demonstrates ten impactful ndings, which we leverage to perform an end-to-end lateral privilege escalation attack in the context of the smart home. Our ndings motivate more systematic and design-level defenses against attacks on the integrity of the users' smart home.
